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AIRLINE LABOR LAWS-A FRESH LOOK
ROBERT J. HICKEY*
T HOSE who handle labor problems on a day-to-day basis often
feel a desire to rewrite the nation's labor laws to undo the
harm done by a court or an agency in perverting the purpose of
these statutes. But then others, both legislators and businessmen,
do not share this interest. Businessmen particularly are unaware of
the degree to which labor laws restrict their rights and the rights
of their employees. That is, until the law is applied to them. For
example, it is not unusual to hear company presidents express
shock at being told that their employees, under the Railway Labor
Act, cannot vote directly against a union.
This does not mean that every unfair or unjust decision should
lead to a change in the law, but rather, labor, management and
the government should periodically review these laws to see whether
the forums that are administering them are protecting the public
interest. This is particularly true of the laws regulating labor rela-
tions in the airlines and railroads, most of which were enacted over
forty years ago and were based on industrial conditions and phi-
losophies then prevalent. In the last forty years, American society
has changed and so has the political and economic power of unions.
Accordingly, there has been an increasing awareness in the last
few years of the need not only to update these laws, but more im-
portantly, to update the philosophy behind them.
I. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD
A. Representation Procedures
One of the major functions of the National Mediation Board is
to establish and administer procedures for the selection, or rejec-
* A.B., Providence College; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., Georgetown
Law Center; Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
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tion, of a union seeking to represent employees in bargaining with
their carrier. This function is accomplished in the provisions of
section 2, Ninth,' of the Railway Labor Act, and part 1206 of the
National Mediation Board's Rules.! In this area the NMB has been
severely, and justly, criticized. Because of this criticism, there have
been many bills introduced in Congress that would curb the
NMB's pro-union bias. Recently, Senator Robert Packwood of
Oregon introduced a bill,8 which appears to have the support of the
Nixon Administration, abolishing the NMB and transferring its
functions to the NLRB." Unfortunately, it is unclear from the bill
whether it applies the representation procedures of section 9 of the
Labor Management Relations Act to rail and air carriers or merely
substitutes the NLRB for the NMB as the enforcer of section 2,
Ninth. By examining selected major facets of NMB representation
procedures, it will become demonstrable that the LMRA and the
NLRB procedures are clearly superior.
1. Carrier Participation in NMB Procedure
Railroad and airline unions have long argued that carriers can-
not participate in National Mediation Board representation pro-
cedures because section 2, Ninth, refers to "any dispute ... among
a carrier's employees" and does not mention disputes between the
carriers and their employees. The unions have also argued that the
Railway Labor Act is designed to foster unionization of employees
and accordingly, carriers should not be allowed to interfere with
this objective. These arguments fail to recognize, however, that
the carrier has a legitimate interest in the election process. First,
both the union's organization campaign and its ultimate representa-
tion of the employees, if selected by them, will have a profound
effect on the company's operations. Second, because only the car-
145 U.S.C. 5152, Ninth (1970).
'29 C.F.R. 5 1206 (1972).
'On February 24, 1972, Senator Packwood introduced his bill, S. 3232, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. 3232)] entitled "Transportation
Crisis Prevention Act of 1972." Senator Packwood has stated that the Adminis-
tration is now supporting his bill; however, the Administration has not yet aban-
doned its own bills, S. 560, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) and H. 4116, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
4S. 3232, Part C, § 222(f) and (j).
3By the same reasoning, the union is not mentioned, yet the union does not
argue and the NMB has not held it not to be a party.
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rier has resources comparable to the resources of the union, it is
the only party that is in a position to see that (i) the craft and
class is properly defined and not merely designed to be coextensive
with the extent to which the union has organized the employees;
(ii) that all eligible employees are permitted to vote and, con-
versely, that ineligible persons are excluded from voting; and (iii)
that the rights of employees who want to remain unrepresented are
protected. It is consistent to both protect these interests and allow
the employees to select, or reject, a bargaining representative free
from unlawful interference by the carrier and union.
Unfortunately, the NMB has accepted the union's position and
has excluded the carrier as a formal party from its proceeding.
The Board does permit the carrier to present its views on the ap-
propriateness of the craft and has, occasionally, held a public
hearing in which the carrier has been allowed to introduce factual
data, to cross-examine witnesses and to file briefs. The Board's
accommodation to the carrier, however, is not the same as granting
these privileges to the carrier as a matter of right in every instance.
Moreover, the carrier has not been permitted to initiate a Board
election or to challenge the results of an election. While the Su-
preme Court has upheld the Board's position,' it was done on the
narrow grounds that the choice of election procedures was within
the discretion of the Board; due process requirements were satis-
fied by the carrier's limited participation. Under the procedures of
the National Labor Relations Board the carrier will be a full par-
ticipant in all representation proceedings. As early as 1947, Con-
gress, in revising the Wagner Act,' included a provision granting
employers both the right to petition for an election! and to par-
ticipate in NLRB procedures.' In addition, the NLRB has pro-
cedures for an employer challenging the results of an election."
2. Union Organization of Supervisors
Section 1, Fifth," defines "employee" to include not only those
' Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract Em-
ployees, 380 U.S. 650, 659-69 (1965).
" Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, S 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
'Id. S 9(c)(1)(B).
'Id. S 9(c)(2). See also 29 C.F.R. 5§ 102.60 et seq. (1970).
1029 C.F.R. 5§ 102.67 and 102.69 (1972).
" 45 U.S.C. § 151, Fifth (1970).
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who normally would come within that definition, but also "sub-
ordinate officials." This term is not further defined in the Act,
NMB regulations or NMB case law. Subordinate officials, however,
have been held to include both first-line supervisors and middle-
management personnel,' and it would appear that the only person
employed by a carrier who might not be a subordinate official is
the president of the carrier.
The inclusion of supervisory personnel in a union works to the
disadvantage of both the carrier and other employees. If a sub-
ordinate official is part of an employee craft and also part of
management, he has dual loyalties. As part of management he
cannot participate in employee meetings without being considered
a company spy. Moreover, his participation would probably be a
violation of section 2, Fourth, 3 which prohibits carrier interference
with the right of its employees to organize and bargain freely.
Conversely, as an employee, he will not fully perform his super-
visory duties (particularly in the areas of discipline and grievance
handling) for the benefit of management. Section 2(3) of the
LMRA" clearly recognizes this conflict and excludes from the
definition of employee "any individual employed as a supervisor. ' '11
While the LMRA does not solve all the problems involved in
determining who is a supervisor, it does eliminate the dual loyalties
problem now existing under the RLA.
3. Craft and Class Determination
Although section 2, Ninth, provides for a method of determining
which union, if any, shall be the representative of the carrier's
employees in a "craft or class," it does not define these terms or
specify the appropriate crafts or classes. But the NMB early took
the position that all crafts or classes must be systemwide." Also,
12 Northwest Airlines, NMB Case No. R-2257 (1953).
1845 U.S.C. 5 152, Fourth (1970).
A 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
""Supervisor" is defined in section 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970), to
include any individual "having authority . . . to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or re-
sponsibility to direct them, or to adjust grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action. ... It is important to note that an individual need not perform
any of the specific functions so long as he can effectively recommend such ac-
tions. E.g., Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 108 (1962).
"New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 1 N.M.B. 1 (1935).
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by 1950, the NMB had established the appropriate crafts in the
airline industry. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze
whether the NMB made the proper determination in establishing
craft lines. Because the present craft lines have been in existence
for over twenty years, the craft lines should not be revised without
the consent of the parties"' or without technological or functional
changes in the industry thereby creating new positions or rendering
certain positions obsolete. 8 Primarily," this has been the NMB's
position.
Under section 9 (b) of the NLRB any of the following may be
determined to be an appropriate bargaining unit: an employer, a
craft, a plant or any subdivision of these. In addition, the parties
may voluntarily agree to a multi-employer unit." The craft concept
under section 9(b)' is more limited than that of section 2, Ninth.
While the NLRB could, under case law," establish systemwide units
similar to those now existing under the RLA, the safest course to
follow would be to add a new subsection (4) to section 9 (b), which
would state that the only appropriate bargaining units in the rail
and air industries are those that were in existence on January 1,
1972, and that the crafts and classes could only be altered by a
showing that technological or functional changes have occurred
that warrant a reevaluation of the craft and class.
'"Northwest Airlines, 2 N.M.B. 54 (1953) (certification for a unit less than
a craft or class does not constitute precedent).
"' See U.N.A. Chapter, Flight Eng. Int'l Ass'n v. NMB, 294 F.2d 904 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
"The NMB is presently conducting an investigation to reevaluate its decision
in N.M.B. Case No. R-1706 (1947). establishing a craft for clerical, office, station
and fleet and passenger service employees. The only apparent reason for "re-
evaluating" the craft was arguments made by certain unions that they could or-
ganize more of these employees if the class were fragmented. After the hearing
started, the various unions were in disagreement over how the fragmentation
should take place and whether it should apply to employees already in a bar-
gaining unit. Because of these divergent views, it has become clear that frag-
mentation of this class on the basis of extent of unionization would be imprac-
tical and contrary to the NMB's stated position. Northwest Airlines, 2 N.M.B.
60, 76 (1951). It probably would also be unlawful. Cf. NLRB v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
"°NLRB v. Teamster Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
:' Mallinckroft Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1967).
"Neo-Gravure Printing Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1407 (1962) (holding a depart-
mental unit to be appropriate when there has been a history of bargaining on
that basis).
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4. Determination of Representative Status
Although the Railway Labor Act contains nothing governing
the form of the ballot to be used in an NMB election, from the
legislative history of the Act it is clear that Congress intended the
NMB to adopt procedures allowing the employees the opportunity
to reject union representation and to remain unorganized. 3 The
NMB has taken the contrary position, however, that the purpose
of the Act is to encourage union representation of a carrier's em-
ployees."' Furthermore, the NMB has decided that the next best
alternative to allowing the union to win every election"3 is to adopt
election procedures maximizing the union's chances of being suc-
cessful.
Instead of being allowed to vote directly against a union by
marking a "no union" box on a ballot, the employee who wants to
remain unrepresented must abstain from voting, since the Board
will not certify the results of an election if less than a majority of
the employees vote.2" As a result of this complex and sophisticated
process, there is danger that an employee might vote for the union
because that is the only choice on the ballot available to him. In
addition, this procedure permits identification of those employees
who "vote" against the union thereby subjecting them to possible
unfair representation if the union becomes their bargaining agent.
2
'H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1934), on H.R. 9861, con-
taining the amendment to the 1926 Act, states: "2. [H.R. 98611 provides that
employees shall be free to join any labor union of their choice and likewise be
free to refrain from joining any union if that be their desire and forbids intter-
ference by the carrier's officers with the exercise of said rights." (Emphasis add-
ed) Similarly, Joseph P. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation and
principal draftsman of the legislation, expressed his view of the bill: "No, it does
not require collective bargaining on the part of the employees. If the employees
do not wish to organize, prefer to deal individually with the management with
regard to these matters, why that, of course, is left open to them, or it should
be." Id. Senate Hearing on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). When it reached
the Senate, Senator Robert F. Wagner, the future author of the National Labor
Relations Act, declared: "I didn't understand these provisions compelled an em-
ployee to join any particular union. I thought the purpose of it was just the op-
posite, to see that the men have absolute liberty to join any union or to remain
unorganized."
UNATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, TWENTY YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR
ACT 14. "The thing of importance . . . is that the interests of the employees
. . . shall be looked after by representatives of their own choosing. In other
words, the Act does not contemplate that its purpose can be achieved without
employee representation. ... "
15The only true election would be when there were two unions involved.
26 There is no mention of this in the N.M.B. Rules and Regulations.
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The unfairness of this process becomes apparent when considering
that a minority union will be certified as the bargaining representa-
tive for all the employees if it receives only twenty-six per cent of
the vote in a situation when a twenty-five per cent vote is cast for
another union and forty-nine per cent of the employees abstain."
In Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for the Benefit
of Non-Contract Employees (ABNE), ' the Supreme Court held
that in view of the Board's practice of treating nonvoters as voting
against the union, the NMB did not exceed its authority by ex-
cluding "no union" from the ballot. While it is true that NMB pro-
cedures give the employees who do not want to be unionized an
opportunity to be heard, it is equally true that they do not give
the employees an effective voice against representation. Under
NLRB procedures" the above pro-union imbalance is removed since
that agency provides for a "no union" box on the ballots; if there
is a runoff, the balloting is between the two choices receiving the
highest number of votes and this includes "no union." By following
the NLRB approach a truly effective voice is given to those em-
ployees who do not want to be represented by a union.
5. Election Bar Rule
Under section 1206.4 of the NMB Rules, the Board will not
permit two immediately successive elections. If the union becomes
certified as a result of the election, then the bar is for a two-year
period; but if the union fails to obtain certification, the bar is only
for one year. There is no reason for this disparate treatment.
Realizing that an election will cause inefficiency and dissension, the
two-year rule provides a period of stability following an election
to allow operations and employee relationships to return to normal.
This same stability is needed regardless of the outcome of the
election. While the NLRB election bar rule applies irrespective of
whether the union wins or loses, it is, however, only for one year."'
Accordingly, the Packwood bill should be amended to provide for
21Aeronautical Radio, N.M.B. Case No. R-3739 (1965), afl'd, 380 F.2d
624, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
11 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for Benefits of Non-Contract Em-
ployees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
29 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 and 102.70 (1972). See also Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947, § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
"29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
19721
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
a two-year insulated period in the LMRA, that would not only
prohibit elections, but also the voluntary grants of recognition.
6. Decertification
In International Bhd. of Team. v. Brotherhood of Ry. A &
S. Cl.," the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia commented:
[1]t is inconceivable that the right to reject collective representa-
tion vanishes entirely if the employees of a unit once choose col-
lective representation. On its face, that is a most unlikely rule,
specifically taking into account the inevitability of substantial turn-
over of personnel with the unit. 2
Unfortunately, what was inconceivable to the court is conceivable
to the NMB, for that agency has not provided for decertification
procedures. This situation is easily rectified, however, by applying
the decertification procedures found in section 9(c) (1) (A) (ii) of
the LMRA. Under that Act, employees wanting to decertify a
union may file a petition with the NLRB, supported by thirty per
cent of the employees in the unit, asserting that the present in-
cumbent no longer "represents" the employees in the unit. In the
subsequent election, if the union receives less than a majority vote,
it is decertified. In the rail and air industries, less than thirty per
cent should be permitted because logistically it would be extremely
difficult for unorganized employees in a systemwide unit to obtain
the necessary thirty per cent support to file a petition.
In summary, the representation problems of the air and rail in-
dustries will not be solved simply by substitution of the NLRB for
the NMB. In addition, it will be necessary to substitute the repre-
sentation procedures of the LMRA for those of RLA, with certain
modifications. Only through this action will the above-discussed
deficiencies be corrected"3 and will the rights of all parties--em-
ployees, unions and carriers-be safeguarded.
B. Mediation
The second major function of the National Mediation Board is
1 Teamsters v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 402 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968).
32 Id.
13 There are additional benefits to be gained from NLRB procedures, which
are not discussed herein.
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mediation. In view of its importance, mediation is probably the
Board's primary function. While mediation is used as a catalyst for
collective bargaining in all industries, its role is radically different
in the rail and air industries. Under section 6 of the Railway Labor
Act, ' there must be a finding by the NMB that its efforts to bring
about an amicable settlement through mediation have failed before
the parties can engage in self-help.' Because the Railway Labor
Act permits the NMB to decide when mediation should cease, the
Board, by the exercise of this discretion,' has the power to bring
pressure on the parties to settle their differences and to enter into
an agreement. Thus, if a union is not engaging in meaningful bar-
gaining, the Board, by holding onto a case, can force the union
back to the bargaining table. Conversely, if the offending party is
the carrier, the Board, by threatening to terminate mediation (and
bring on a strike), will find the carrier more than willing to return
to the bargaining table.
Under Senator Packwood's bill, the mediation function of the
Board will be transferred to the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service." In addition, section 6 of the Railway Labor Act is
revised by eliminating the compulsory mediation features of the
present Act. It seems strange that this unique feature of the Rail-
way Labor Act is being discarded in a bill entitled "Transportation
Crises Prevention Act of 1972," for it will represent a significant
loss to labor peace in both the airline and railroad industries.
Accordingly, the mediation function should be continued in what-
ever bill is adopted.
II. COURTS
The Railway Labor Act sets forth a number of unfair labor
practices similar to those governing industries subject to the Labor
- 45 U.S.C. S 156 (1970).
3Although there is an intermediate step of proferred arbitration, this has
proved meaningless in recent years, since only one party, normally the union,
can escape arbitration merely by rejecting it.
" Although in International Ass'n of Machinist v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), the court of appeals stated that there were limits to the exercise to
that discretion, the test the court stated to be applied would rarely result in judi-
cial intrusion into the mediation process.
$I S. 3232, Part C, § 222(g).
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Management Relations Act.38 Both Acts prohibit:
(1) interference with employees' right to engage in concerted
action;"
(2) domination of or assistance to a labor organization by an
employer;"°
(3) discrimination to encourage or discourage union member-
ship;1 or,
(4) refusal to bargain in good faith."2
In addition, while there is no provision prohibiting jurisdictional
strikes, "' the same result has been reached by treating these dis-
putes as representation questions, subject to the National Mediation
Board." Unlike the Labor Management Relations Act, however, the
RLA does not prohibit secondary boycotts' and "hot cargo" agree-
ments." It is also unclear whether recognitional picketing" could
38 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 1 et seq., 29
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
"
9Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §S 7, 8(a)(1),
8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 158(b)(1)(A) (1971); Railway
Labor Act § 2, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. 5 152, Fourth (1970).
4'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1971). Railway Labor Act § 2, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Fourth (1970).
41 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §5 8(a) (3), 8(b) (2),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(b)(2) (1971). Railway Labor Act § 2, Fourth,
Fifth, and Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh (1970).
42 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1971). Railway Labor Act 5 2, First, Second,
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth (1970).
4 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 8(b) (4) (D),
10(k), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(D), 160(k) (1970).
"Compare Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 336 (1943) with Transpor-
tation & Communication Employees v. Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
' Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (4) (B), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970); see International Bro. of Elec. Wkrs. v. NLRB,
394 U.S. 492 (1969). Carriers may obtain limited protection, however, under the
Labor Management Relations Act. See also B.B. McCormick & Co., 150 N.L.R.B.
363 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
4'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (1970). In Lufthansa German Airline, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1972),
the NLRB held that for purposes of section 8(e) an air carrier was prohibited
from entering into a "hot cargo" agreement with a union that was not predomi-
nantly composed of rail and air employees.
"Labor Manageemnt Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b)(7), 29
U.S.C. S 158(b)(7) (1970).
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be prohibited as interference with the employees' right to choose
their representative.""
Section 10 of the LMRA establishes an administrative pro-
cedure for enjoining, hearing and deciding unfair labor practices.
Review and enforcement is provided through the United States
Court of Appeals. On the other hand, the Railway Labor Act
does not specify the administrator of its provisions. Although the
Act does provide for criminal penalties for "willful failure or re-
fusal of any carrier, its officers, or agents to comply with" 9 the
law, this provision has proved completely ineffective and imprac-
tical because the punishment bears no relation to the activity being
regulated and does not directly benefit the employees affected by
the unlawful conduct.
Over the years the question has been raised whether the Act's
provisions are enforceable either by the courts in a civil action or
by the National Mediation Board. Although the Railway Labor
Act is one of the nation's oldest labor laws, this question was not
decided until last year in Chicago & North Western Railway Com-
pany v. United Transportation Union,0 when the Supreme Court
held that the mandates of the Railway Labor Act are enforceable
by injunctive relief in a federal court. At the same time, the Su-
preme Court held that the National Mediation Board held no
adjudicative role in regard to "unfair labor practices." 1
The decision of the Supreme Court is clearly supported by the
legislative history of the Railway Labor Act. The Transportation
Act of 1920,"' the predecessor of the present act, contained bar-
gaining obligations similar to those now found in section 2, First
and Second. But these provisions were found by the Supreme Court
in Pennsylvania Railroad System Federation v. Pennsylvania R.R 3
to be unenforceable in a court of law. In 1926 Congress repealed
this Act and enacted the Railway Labor Act of 1926.' During
the hearings, Donald R. Richberg, the architect of the proposed
"Railway Labor Act § 2, Fourth 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1970).
49Railway Labor Act § 2, Tenth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (1970).
50402 U.S. 570 (1971).
51 1d. at 581.
"zThe Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
53267 U.S. 203 (1925).
"Railway Labor Act, §§ 1-208, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
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legislation, testified that the Act would be legally enforceable."
The reason for not stating this expressly in the bill was because of
the belief of the carriers' unions that it would be preferable "for
the law of such enforcement or compulsion to be developed in the
courts, according to the old common law of letting the courts
develop the law after the obligations are clearly understood.""'
Moreover, the legislative history also provides that the Board of
Mediation, the predecessor of the National Mediation Board, was
to have no adjudicatory function," to prevent its mediation func-
tions from being compromised.
The Supreme Court in Texas & N.O. R.R. v. BRC,8 held that
Congress in the 1926 Act "did impose certain, definite legal
obligations enforceable by judicial proceedings." After the passage
of the 1934 Act, which adopted, verbatim, most of the provisions
of the 1926 Act, the Supreme Court in Virginia Ry. Co. v. System
Federation,"9 again held that the provisions of the Act were not
merely precatory but were legally enforceable. Despite these clear
rulings of the Supreme Court, many parties continued to argue
either that courts held only a limited adjudicatory power or that
this power was really vested in the National Mediation Board. All
doubts about judicial enforceability of the Act, however, were
resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago & North
Western."
The dispute in Chicago & North Western revolved around the
number of brakemen to be employed on each train following an
elimination of most of the brakemen's jobs by a Congressionally
appointed Arbitration Board."1 Prior to the expiration date of the
award, the United Transportation Union served section 6 notices
on the Chicago & North Western Railroad and several other carriers
requesting that they negotiate the reestablishment of the brake-
men's position. The carriers countered both with their own section
55 Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. at 21-22, 40, 41, 66, and 84-85 (1925) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
" Hearings at 41.
-
7 Id. at 18.
6281 U.S. 548, 567 (1930).
59300 U.S. 515, 545, 547-48, 550 (1937).
60402 U.S. 570 (1971).
6177 Stat. 132 (1963).
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6" notices that would leave this decision to management and with
a request that the issue be negotiated in a conference between the
union and all the carriers affected. During the subsequent negotia-
tions Chicago & North Western offered alternative proposals that
would have reduced the number of brakemen on a crew and, at
the same time, increased the compensation of the remaining em-
ployees in the crew. The union rejected multi-carrier bargaining,
however, and refused to discuss any compromise, which would be
more favorable than those negotiated with other carriers.
In these circumstances, negotiations and mediation proved fruit-
less. After the National Mediation Board had terminated its serv-
ices, it was anticipated that the union would strike the carriers."
Before the union could act, however, Chicago & North Western
sought an injunction against the strike on the grounds that the
union had not exhausted the Railway Labor Act remedies because
it had failed to engage in good faith bargaining. The Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision, agreed with the carrier that sec-
tion 2, First, imposed a legal obligation on carriers and unions; that
this obligation was enforceable by the judiciary and not by the
National Mediation Board; and, finally, that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act"4 did not strip federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin union
strikes in this situation. Because of the possibility of abuse, how-
ever, the Court counselled restraint by federal courts in the is-
suance of the injunctions."
With respect to the bargaining obligation imposed under the
62Railway Labor Act § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1970) provides: "Carriers and
representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written notice of
intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions,
and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representa-
tives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon with-
in ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty
days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change
has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the
services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said
Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall
not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon as
required by section 5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten
days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer
of the services of the Mediation Board."
63 Arbitration was proffered by the NMB but was rejected by the UTU. An
emergency board was not appointed under section 16 of the RLA. See 45 U.S.C.
160 (1970).
629 U.S.C. 5 101 et seq. (1970).
"402 U.S. 570, 583 (1971).
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Act, the Court held that mere compliance with the Act's pro-
cedures would be meaningless if one party went through the mo-
tions without a desire to reach agreement; at a minimum, section
2, First, required the parties to bargain in good faith with the in-
tention of making every reasonable effort toward resolving the
bargaining dispute. The Court saw no occasion at that time to
detail the scope of duty to bargain other than to note that the case
presented did not require a determination of "whether [section] 2,
First, requires more of the parties than the avoidance of 'bad
faith'.""
On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that both Chicago & North Western and
the union had not bargained in good faith." While normal equity
doctrines would have meant the denial of the carrier's request for
an injunction, the district court believed that an injunction was
warranted because of the irreparable harm caused the public by
the parties' bargaining conduct. Moreover, the court stated that
when the union had demonstrated that it was engaging in good
faith bargaining, irrespective of whether the carrier was also ful-
filling its bargaining duties, the court would vacate the injunction
and allow the union to engage in self-help. On December 22, 1971,
the court vacated the injunction." The union immediately sought
and was granted an expedited appeal. On August 1, 1972, the
United States Court of Appeals held, in light of the bad-faith bar-
gaining at all stages of the Railway Labor Act procedures, that it
was necessary for the parties to repeat those steps, not merely to
engage in good faith conferences as a last step as indicated by the
district judge. Although the court of appeals did not spell out what
would constitute good faith bargaining during the repetition of
those steps, it did note that "adamant positions-crystallized dur-
ing the previous bad faith sessions of the parties-must be cast
aside before good faith negotiation and conciliation will succeed. '""
"402 U.S. at 579, n. 11. In the same footnote the Court cautioned that the
duty to bargain under the Railway Labor Act might not be the same as that
under the National Labor Relations Act, and that "great circumspection should
be used in going beyond cases involving desire not to reach agreement for doing
so risks infringement of the strong federal labor policy against government inter-
ference with the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."
11330 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
6"336 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. 111. 1971).
69422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970).
AVIATION LABOR PROBLEMS
The court further instructed the trial court to be certain that the
parties are in strictest compliance with the Act before allowing
them to engage in self-help."
In Erie Lackawanna Railway Company v. Longshoremen,"1 the
United States District Court for New Jersey had the opportunity
to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago & North Western
to a multi-carrier bargaining situation. As part of its section 6 de-
mands, the union had requested that a guaranteed annual wage
provision be included in the contract. During negotiations the
union listened to the carrier's proposals that would have eliminated
the guaranteed annual wage provision from the contract but refused
to surrender on this point, although it made several minor changes
in its proposal. While the negotiations were in progress, Penn
Central withdrew from the multi-carrier bargaining without objec-
tion from the other carriers and entered an agreement without the
guaranteed annual wage. After the exhaustion of the Act's pro-
cedures, the union struck and the company sought an injunction.
Applying the principles in Chicago & North Western, the district
court refused to issue an injunction by holding (i) that a guaran-
teed annual wage was a mandatory subject of bargaining; (ii) that
the union bargaining position in regard to this clause did not
demonstrate bad faith bargaining; and (iii) that the union had not
engaged in unlawful whipsaw tactics by signing a more favorable
agreement with the Penn Central, since Penn Central had volun-
tarily, and without objection from the other carriers, withdrawn
from the multi-employer bargaining group. In refusing to issue the
injunction, the court stressed the Supreme Court's caveat that fed-
eral courts should not use their powers lightly to enjoin self-help.
Chicago & North Western has ushered in a new era in labor
relations in the air and rail industries. While it is too early to ac-
curately forecast whether the courts will do a better job than an
administrative agency, it is unlikely that a multitude of courts will
develop the same institutional biases that have plagued state and
federal agencies responsible for administering our labor laws. In
addition, Senator Packwood's bill does not change the existing law
in regard to unfair labor practices. While agreeing this responsibil-
ity should not be given to the NLRB, this author would have pre-
70 id.
71338 F. Supp. 955 (D.N.J. 1972).
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ferred the modification of the Railway Labor Act to outlaw secon-
dary boycotts, hot cargo agreements and recognitional picketing.
HI. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
A. Petition to Revoke Certification
The third major forum that regulates the labor relations of air-
lines is the Civil Aeronautics Board. Although section 401 (k) (4)
of the Federal Aviation Act of 19582 required as a condition for
holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity that an
air carrier must comply with the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act, neither this section nor any other section of that Act explains
how the CAB is to determine whether an airline is in compliance.
Two questions are immediately apparent: first, should the CAB
make the initial determination of whether an airline has violated
the Railway Labor Act or should this determination be left to
another forum; and, second, should every violation of the Railway
Labor Act result in the revocation of the certification of an air-
line or should this penalty be imposed only for serious violations
that demonstrate a carrier's complete disregard of the Act?
The carriers, unions and employees had to wait twenty years
before these questions were answered. The issue was finally pre-
sented to the CAB in Airline Pilots Association v. Southern Air-
ways." In this case Southern Airways and the Airline Pilots Asso-
ciation entered into an agreement that would continue in effect
until October 1, 1958, and would automatically be renewed on a
year-to-year basis unless written notice of intended change was
served in accordance with section 6 of the Railway Labor Act.
Pursuant to the agreement, on July 30, 1959, the union served a
section 6 notice on the airline.' On February 17, 1960, while
bargaining was still in progress, the National Mediation Board
formally terminated its services. On June 5, 1960, the union struck
" The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401(k)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(k)(4)
(1970).
"36 C.A.B. 430 (1962).
,4 In a related case, Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Southern Airways, Inc., 44 CCH
Lab. Cas. 5 17,460 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), appeal dismissed without opinion (6th
Cir. 1962), the court held that the effect of the notice was to terminate the con-
tract. See IAMAW v. Reeves Aleutian Airways, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 332 (D. Alas.
1971).
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the carrier and Southern began hiring replacements for the striking
employees.
Despite the strike, bargaining and mediation continued. In addi-
tion to the items raised by the union's section 6 notice, the carrier
proposed three new items: (i) that replacement pilots be given
seniority superior to any reinstated pilots; (ii) that the company
be allowed to take disciplinary action, without recourse to the
statutory grievance procedure, in regard to any pilot who engaged
in misconduct during the strike; and (iii) that the pilots be as-
signed certain duties in regard to the moving and parking of air-
craft. On July 28, 1960, the parties came to an impasse over the
carrier's proposal regarding the moving of aircraft.
The union then filed a petition with the CAB, seeking to have
Southern's certificate revoked for failure "to exert every reasonable
effort to make and maintain agreements . . . and to settle all dis-
putes as required by [s]ection 2, First, of the Railway Labor Act.""5
The CAB's Examiner held that the Board is the proper agency to
determine whether a carrier had violated the Railway Labor Act.
His conclusion in this regard was based on an interpretation of
sections 401 (g) and 1002 of the Federal Aviation Act that require
the CAB to investigate complaints and to hold hearings prior to
revocation of any certificate." In rejecting Southern's argument that
" Air line Pilots Ass'n v. Southern Airways, Inc., Docket No. 11,654, CAB
Order No. E-18560 (July 5, 1962), [1960-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L.
Rep. 5 21,297. While this litigation was in process, ALPA also filed a complaint
in a federal district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 (1970). See note 3
supra. The court refused Southern's request for a stay pending final decision by
the CAB and ruled that its action was separate and different from the Board's
and that any determination by the Board on factual or legal issues would be
neither res judicata nor a guide to the court. In the CAB hearing the Board
acknowledged that it had been furnished with copies of the Court's Opinion,
Findings of Fact and Law and Judgment, but the Board proceeded to make its
own determination of those same issues, stating that: "[bly parity of reasoning
we conclude that the Board must make its own determination on the issues of
its proceeding, and that it is open to the Board to draw inferences and reach con-
clusions which may differ from those reached by the Court."
7649 U.S.C. §§ 1482(a) and 1371(g) (1970), respectively. Section 1002(a)
states that it is the "duty" of the CAB to investigate a complaint if there appears
"to be any reasonable ground"; and, if the investigation renders that any person
"has failed to comply with any provision of the Act or any requirement estab-
lished pursuant thereto, the Administrator or the Board shall issue an appropriate
order to compel such person to comply therewith." Section 401(g) provides that
the Board may, after notice and hearing, suspend or revoke any certificate for
"intentional failure to comply with any provision of this title," or any "condition"
attaching such certificate.
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the CAB's jurisdiction arises only after an unfair labor practice
determination has been made by another forum, the Examiner
focused only on the lack of authority of the NMB in this area and
did not consider the federal courts as a possible forum to litigate
these issues.'
By the time the case reached the Board, Southern had dropped
its contention that the Board lacked jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Board found it necessary to comment on its jurisdiction to hear
the case:
While the exact role the Board is to play in the enforcement of
obligations placed on air carriers by the Railway Labor Act is un-
settled-and the legislative history of section 401 (k) is of little or
no help-we agree with the examiner's conclusion that the Board
must proceed on the premise that it was the intent of the Congress
that the Board in appropriate cases is the forum to hear and deter-
mine complaints alleging violation of such obligations by air car-
riers. We find that the Board has jurisdiction over the complaint."
Regarding the merits of the union's charge, the Board found
that Southern's demands for superseniority for the replacement
pilots" and for absolute control over discipline of the strikes"0
constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of the
Railway Labor Act. Faced with the question of whether an auto-
matic revocation must follow and realizing the disastrous conse-
quences of this penalty, the Board imposed a more traditional
remedy of directing Southern to commence good faith bargaining
within thirty days. At the same time, the CAB made clear that the
failure of Southern to comply with its order would result in the
revocation of its certificate.'
7736 C.A.B. 430 at 462-67 (1962).
78 Id. at 433.
"9 The Board held that during an economic strike a company may hire re-
placements needed to continue its business and that the company need not termi-
nate the service of the replacements to reinstate strikers at the end of the strike.
However, the Board was of the opinion that superseniority for the replacement
would be per se discriminatory. On this point, the district court reached the op-
posite conclusion. 44 CCH Lab. Cas. 3 17,460 at page 26,221.
80 Railway Labor Act, § 204, 45 U.S.C. S 184 (1970), requires that an air
carrier and its employees establish appropriate procedures for handling griev-
ances. In the CAB's view, the strikers who had been replaced retained the status
of striking employees and were entitled to have disciplinary grivances settled in
accordance with Section 204 procedures.
81 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Southern Airways, Inc., 37 C.A.B. 765, 766-67
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Based on both legal and policy considerations, the CAB should
not have established itself as the national airlines labor relations
board. Analysis of the Board's findings that it had primary juris-
diction in this area results in the inescapable conclusion that the
CAB believed that it was the only forum that would or could de-
cide the unfair labor practice issues. Since the recent Chicago &
North Western case," holding that federal courts have the juris-
diction to enjoin compliance with mandates of the Railway Labor
Act, there exists no reason why the CAB should not now abstain
from ruling on petitions to revoke until a judicial determination
has been rendered on the merits of the violation.
The policy reasons in favor of CAB abstention are abundantly
clear. First, unlike the courts, the CAB has, under its interpretation
of section 401 (k) (4), authority only to pass on carrier, and not
on union, unfair labor practices. The CAB, by providing a forum
to unions alone, has given the unions a weapon to use against the
employer in bargaining. Only through abstention by the CAB can
mutuality and bargaining parity be restored. Second, if the CAB
were to defer to the court, the entire case would be litigated in one
forum, thereby conserving Board and court resources and avoiding
needless litigation expenses for the parties. Finally the Board
should not embroil itself in labor disputes; the Board lacks the
expertise and manpower to handle these cases."
(1963). The Southern Pilots Association also sought review through the courts.
In Southern Pilots Association v. CAB, 323 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court
noted, with apparent approval, the action of the CAB in denying intervention to
Southern Pilots Association. Following this decision, the parties entered into a
contract which, in effect, granted the striking pilots seniority over all the replace-
ments. The replaced pilots hurriedly formed their own union, filed a petition with
the NMB asserting that they, rather than ALPA, were bargaining representative
of the employees, and filed a petition with the CAB for a rehearing and inter-
vention. The CAB denied petitioners' application, declaring that ". . . The
Board does not consider that it can look behind the National Mediation Board's
designation of ALPA as the collective bargaining agent for (the airline's) pilots
or inquire into whether the union had discriminated against petitioners in its rep-
resentation functions.
11 Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
13ALEA v. CAB, 413 F.2d 1092, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Outland v. CAB,
284 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1960); American-Trans Caribbean Merger, Order
71-5-30 at 4 (C.A.B. May 7, 1971). Without a day-to-day contact with the com-
plex labor relations in the industry, the Board cannot expect to have the necessary
knowledge to decide these cases on the merits. Decisions rendered on the basis
of part-time acquaintance can only result in operational problems, discontent
and unending litigation. In view of the CAB's own admission (which has also
been recognized by the courts) that the Board "lacks expertise in labor matters,"
1972]
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In the ten years since the Southern Airways decision, the CAB
has recognized its lack of expertise to adjudicate these cases. While
the Board has not overruled Southern Airways, it has achieved the
same result by deferring to other tribunals. In Flight Engineers'
International Association, EAL Chapter v. Eastern Airlines," the
Board, dismissing the complaint on the motion of the carrier,
stated:
The public interest would not be served if the Board were to
proceed with a hearing solely to provide a forum for the adjust-
ment of private grievances, particularly where an adequate remedy
is available in the courts."
This policy of deferral was affirmed in IBT v. Western Airlines,"
the most recent CAB decision under section 401 (k) (4). The
complaint filed by the union alleged that Western Airlines had
violated section 401 (k) (4) by refusing to process a grievance that
would have required Western to negotiate post-merger labor pro-
tective conditions at a time when Western's proposed merger with
American was still pending before the CAB. The Director of the
Bureau of Enforcement dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that the dispute was either a representation dispute that could be
resolved by the National Mediation Board or a contract dispute
"properly settled by a suit in an appropriate court." Because the
parties were still engaged in arbitration, the CAB refused to order
an investigation with the following comment:
it seems strange that the CAB felt compelled in Southern Airways to transform
itself into a labor court.
'38 CAB 1192 (1963).
851d. at 1194. The deferral process is not limited to courts. In a case involv-
ing a dispute between ALPA and AAXICO Airways over a reinstitution of op-
erations, ALPA v. CAB, 360 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia stated that the Board should be extremely reluctant
to involve itself in disputes between an air carrier and its employees when the
subject matter of the court complaint was in the process of resolution by the
airlines system board of adjustment. Also, in ALEA v. Allegheny Airlines, Docket
No. 20,038 (April 23, 1969), the CAB Bureau of Enforcement refused to process
a complaint by ALEA that Allegheny, after its merger with Lake Central Airlines,
had refused to bargain with ALEA as the bargaining representative of the former
Lake Central fleet and passenger employees on the basis that ALEA did not rep-
resent a majority of the employees of the class in the merged carrier. The Bureau
held that the matter was a representation dispute that could only be resolved
by the National Mediation Board.
"Order 71-12-109 (CAB, December 23, 1971).
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The basic controversy reflected by the IBT complaint is essentially
whether, or to what extent and in what manner, the Western labor
contracts may be enforced in the event of an American-Western
merger.... If the merger is approved, all questions relating to
enforcement of the IBT contract can then be resolved by the ap-
propriate tribunal or tribunals in light of the circumstances then
present, including the results of the arbitration and negotiations now
in progress. The complainant has obtained by other methods all
present relief which the Board as a practical matter could be
expected to grant, and this irrespective of whether the Board was
the appropriate forum in which to seek enforcement action.87
In view of the history of section 401 (k) (4) since the Southern
Airways case, it is evident that the Board will defer unfair labor
practice charges in most, if not all, instances to other forums (e.g.,
courts, the NMB, system boards of adjustment and arbitration).
To prevent needless litigation expense the CAB should clearly state
that it will entertain a section 401 (k) (4) petition only after the
merits of the underlying disputes have been determined by another
tribunal adversely to the air carrier and only after the carrier has
refused to comply with that determination. Unfortunately, Senator
Packwood's bill does not address itself to the CAB's intrusion into
the labor law arena; hopefully the bill will be amended to eliminate
section 401 (k) (4).
B. Regulation of Group Bargaining
Under section 412(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958"8
an airline is required to file with the CAB a copy of every agree-
ment affecting transportation. Section 412(b) 9 requires the Board
to approve or disapprove these agreements based on whether the
agreement is adverse to the public interest or is in violation of
other provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. Because of section
401 (k) (4) every agreement concerned with employees must be
measured not only against section 102 of the FAA," but also against
the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
The CAB has had the opportunity to examine only one agree-
ment under these provisions:1 the Airlines Mutual Aid Pact. Be-
87 Id. at 5.
88Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 412(a), 49 U.S.C. S 1382(a) (1970).
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 412(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970).
"
0Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
"' On April 6, 1971, there was filed an agreement entitled "Agreement to Es-
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cause the CAB began its investigation of this Pact and its various
amendments thirteen years ago, it is important to discuss its his-
tory. In October 1958, the major air carriers anticipated a whip-
saw strike by the unions and entered into an agreement to strengthen
their bargaining position. Under their plan, payments (referred to
as windfall payments) were to be made to any signatory carrier in
the event the carrier's flight operations were shut down because
of (i) a strike to enforce union demands in excess of or opposed
to the recommendations of a Presidential Emergency Board ap-
pointed under section 10 of the Railway Labor Act; (ii) a strike
undertaken before section 6 procedures had been exhausted; and
(iii) strikes otherwise unlawful. The operating carriers were to
pay the strike-bound carrier payments based on increased reve-
nues attributable to the strike less applicable direct expenses. In
return, the struck carrier was to make every reasonable effort to
refer its passengers to the non-struck signatory carriers. On May
20, 1959, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved this agreement
for a three-year period on the condition that the passenger referral
clause of the Pact be deleted because it was anti-competitive."
During March and April 1964, the carriers amended their plan
to cover all strikes except (i) strikes called to enforce demands
equal to or less than those recommended by the Presidential
Emergency Board; (ii) strikes when the Emergency Board had
not issued a report; and (iii) strikes involving disputes with car-
riers who had violated the Railway Labor Act. In addition to the
so-called windfall payments, the amended Pact required the non-
struck carriers to make, as a minimum payment, an additional
supplemental payment if the windfall payment did not reach twenty-
five per cent of the normal air transport operating revenues of the
struck carrier.' Two other major amendments were added: one
limiting participation to trunk carriers, and the other providing for
arbitration to settle all the payment disputes. On July 10, 1964, a
CAB Hearing Examiner, after a hearing, issued a seventy-page
tablish the Airline Industrial Relations Conference" (AIRCO). This agreement
has been docketed (Docket 23,267) under the name "Alaska Airlines, Inc., and
Eleven Certificated Route Air Carriers."
"' Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 CAB 168 (1959).
"In no event were the supplemental payments to exceed one-half of one
per cent of the non-struck carrier's operating revenues for the prior year.
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opinion affirming the legality of the plan and its amendments. The
Board on July 10, 1964, adopted the Examiner's decision."
Hearings were again held in 1968 to consider the legality of the
pact. After the hearings had concluded, the carriers on October 31,
1969, again amended the Pact. Of the several amendments, the
most important concerned the change in the supplemental pay-
ments formula whereby payments were to be increased to fifty per
cent for the first two weeks, forty-five per cent for the third week,
forty per cent for the fourth week and thirty-five per cent there-
after." The new agreements eased the conditions of entry to permit
any trunk carrier to join the agreement by a specified date with-
out a waiting period and without back payment. On March 7,
1970, the Examiner, without considering the new amendments,
held that the plan and its operation were lawful. On July 23,
1970, the Board approved the Examiner's decision."
The six unions involved requested the Board to reconsider its
order in view of the amendments and two strikes involving mem-
bers of the Pact: National Airlines and Northwest Airlines. Al-
though the Board was not persuaded that its earlier determination
was in error, it remanded the case for the taking of evidence with
respect to the amended agreement.' On January 1, 1971, the
Mutual Aid Pact was amended to permit the entry of local service
carriers."'
During the thirteen years that these proceedings have been in
progress the union parties have contended that the Mutual Aid
Pact was in violation of:
(i) Section 102 because the Pact would cause an imbalance
in union-management power that would inevitably lead
to labor strife;"9
'Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559 (1964).
85 The limit of payments from a non-struck carrier rose from one-half of one
per cent to one per cent.
" Airline Mutual Aid Pact, Order No. 70-7-114 (C.A.B. July 23, 1970).
"'Order No. 70-11-110 (C.A.B. Nov. 23, 1970). Although the Order states
that new investigation would be limited to the amendments to the Pact, the Board
in a footnote requested evidence on the "agreement's role, if any, in affecting the
bargaining balance between labor and management in the air industry."
98 The following local service carriers have joined: Air West, Frontier, North
Central, Ozark, Piedmont and Mohawk.
"' After losing before the Board in 1959 and 1964 on this point, the unions
completely reversed their attack in 1970 by arguing that the Pact was not neces-
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(ii) Section 2, First, because the Pact constituted a repudiation
of carrier's obligation to bargain in good faith or, at a
minimum, an impediment to collective bargaining; and
Section 2, Second, because it would result in other car-
riers influencing the bargaining position of another car-
rier; 0 and,
(iii) Various antitrust laws because the Pact was anticompeti-
tive.
With respect to the section 102 argument, the Board replied
that the question was not whether the Mutual Aid Pact would or
would not cause an imbalance, but whether any imbalance re-
sulting would affect the development of a viable and efficient air
system. Under this test the Board, in both the 1959 and 1964
cases, found that the unions had failed to demonstrate that the Pact
jeopardized this statutory objective."' In fact the contrary was true
sary for the protection of the carriers and that its continued existence would only
cause industrial strife for the public and a detrimental effect for the carriers
themselves. (As to the latter point, the unions claimed that the carriers would
have been better off had they accepted the I.A.M. offer in 1966 instead of re-
sisting, accepting a strike and relying on the pact to protect them.) The Board
again found no evidence to support any of these propositions. First, strike ac-
tivity for the 1958-63 period was approximately the same for Pact members and
non-members. Second, the carrier members had signed over 221 contracts with
unions during the ten-year period. Third, even assuming the Pact caused strikes,
the Board believed there was no showing that it adversely affected the air trans-
port system. Fourth, strikes during the ten-year period again demonstrated the
vulnerability of carriers and the need for protection against strikes. And fifth,
there was no evidence that the Pact was crucial to the carriers' rejection of the
I.A.M. offer in 1966. (As for whether the carriers should have resisted, the Board
found this decision was left to the carrier by out national labor policy and the
Board would not "second guess" them.) Since the Board in Order 70-11-110
framed the issue in terms of imbalance, we can anticipate the unions to return
to their former arguments.
"~ During the course of the litigation, the unions have also asserted that the
Pact violated other sections of the R.L.A. First, in the 1959 case, the unions
claimed that by paying benefits for strikers in excess of or opposed to Emergency
Board recommendations, the carriers were attempting to force a union to accept
the Emergency Board's recommendations contrary to section 10 of the R.L.A.,
which makes acceptance or rejection of the recommendations voluntary. The
Board rejected this argument, holding that there was nothing either in S 10 or
its legislative history which indicated that Congress intended to prohibit private
economic pressure to force acceptance of Emergency Board recommendations.
In the absence of this, the Board was not inclined to graft this requirement onto
the Act. Second, in the 1970 litigation, the unions contended that the pact vio-
lated § 2, Fourth (right to organize); § 2, Fifth (agreement to join or not to
join a union); and 2, Eleventh (union security clause). These contentions were
not put forth with any force and were summarily rejected by the Board.
" In 1964 litigation, the Board found that the union evidence did not play
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for the Board found in the 1964 case that the strike insurance
had provided a degree of stability to an industry vulnerable to
strikes.
The Board also rejected the arguments that the Pact violated
either sections 2, First or Second. The Board viewed the Pact as
the equivalent of union strike benefits and held there was no evi-
dence on which to assume that the Pact would operate to prevent
a carrier from bargaining in good faith or to impede a prompt
settlement of a strike. The Board noted that despite strike insur-
ance benefits, a struck carrier would still suffer loss of operating
revenue, fixed costs, extraordinary strike expenses and diversion
of future traffic. The Board opined that these would serve as an
incentive to the struck carrier to avoid strikes and, if struck, to
settle promptly. The Board further found that the Pact did not
create a situation in which non-struck carriers would attempt to
place pressure on the struck carriers to end the strike, since the
Pact on its face did not impose on a struck carrier the obligation
to consult with the other carriers in regard to its relations with the
striking union. Finally, the Board stated that even if the Pact
interfered with the carrier's duties under the Railway Labor Act
the unions should seek relief from the courts and not the Board."'
The unions have advanced the argument that the Pact is anti-
competitive in violation of the antitrust laws. The Board found,
however, that not only did the Pact tend to not monopolize or
restrain competition, but that it actually aided competition by
making struck carriers more viable. Moreover, the recent amend-
ments allowing local service carriers to participate in the Pact has
destroyed the unions' argument that the Pact discriminated against
these carriers.
It would normally be assumed that after all these hearings the
question of the legality of the Mutual Aid Pact had been resolved
in favor of the carriers. Unfortunately, that is not the case. In
a significant role in any strike during the 1959-1963 period. It also rejected the
union argument that any deterioration in labor relations during this period should
be attributed to the Pact.
... The Board heavily relied on the decision in Kennedy v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 211 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afJ'd, 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963), where the same arguments were rejected in
regard to railroad strike insurance plan. See also Operating Engineers Local 12
(A.G.C.), 187 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1970).
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passing upon a motion °. for reconsideration, the CAB withdrew
its approval of 1969 amendments because they had not been ex-
posed to an evidentiary hearing."' A new hearing was held and
evidence was taken in regard to both 1969 amendments and 1970
amendments, which permitted the participation of local service
carriers. On March 27, 1972, the Examiner issued his decision
holding (i) that local services should not be permitted to partici-
pate in the Pact, and (ii) that the formula had to be modified to
reduce the amount of benefits under the Pact. The examiner's
decision was not based on the public interest criteria" but solely
on whether benefits outweighed the disadvantages. The Examiner's
decision is now before the full Board, and it is hoped that it will
be reversed.
Although the carriers have emerged successful in the litigation,
the question arises whether any of this litigation really is neces-
sary. As the Board noted, the real issue presented by section 412
is whether a given agreement would affect the development of a
viable and efficient system. In none of these cases did the unions
present facts that would have warranted a hearing and, conse-
quently, the Board should have perfunctorily dismissed the unions'
objections. This is particularly true in the situation in which the
unions have had thirteen years to establish a case. In these circum-
stances, it is unlikely that the unions will ever be able to present
additional facts to support their allegations. Nevertheless, the CAB
seems unwilling to stop this litigation.
C. Labor Protective Conditions
Unemployment has always been, and unfortunately continues
to be, of vital concern to society. Because of the cyclical nature of
the American economy and individual industries, there has been
little that could be done in the past to prevent the events that give
rise to unemployment or to alleviate economic suffering of the un-
employed once it has occurred. With the coming of the twentieth
century, however, there appeared the phenomenon of planned un-
'
03Mutual Aid Pact, Order 70-11-110 (CAB Nov. 23, 1970).
104 The hearing was granted despite the fact that the Board stated that it did
not believe its earlier decision had been in error.
105 There are numerous examples of this in the decision. For example, on
pages 31 and 32, the Examiner held that the record did not "demonstrate that
the viability of any carrier had been critically threatened because of the higher
level of contributions ....
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employment resulting from consolidation of business facilities,
primarily through mergers. Many employers in these circumstances
voluntarily provided protection for their employees, such as grant-
ing severance for dismissed employees and moving and transporta-
tion expenses for the relocated employees."'
In the midst of the depression the government intervened to
protect the employees in the country's rail industry. Section 7(b)
of Title I of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933°'
prohibited the dismissal of any employees on railroad payrolls.
Because of criticism by railroads and the Federal Coordinator of
Railroads 8 that the "job freeze" prevented rail carriers from making
organization changes necessary to becoming a viable industry, the
Act was permitted to expire. Faced with the threat of new restrictive
legislation, the railroads and the rail unions entered into a compre-
hensive employee protective arrangement entitled the "Agreement
of May, 1936, Washington, D.C." and commonly referred to as the
"Washington Job Protection Agreement.'"'
The agreement provided for (i) a "coordination allowance" for
employees who were temporarily and permanently displaced; (ii) a
displacement allowance for employees who were placed in lower-
paying positions; (iii) relocation expenses for employees forced to
move; and (iv) preservation of employee fringe benefits. Based on
the authority of section 5(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act"'
to approve mergers "subject to such items and conditions and modi-
fications as it shall find just and reasonable" and that "will promote
the public interest," in 1939, the ICC proscribed labor protective
conditions (modeled on those in the Washington Job Protection
Agreement) in a railroad organization."' The Commission's au-
thority was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lowden.' and was formally enacted into law as section 5 (2) (f) of
the Transportation Act of 1940."
"Report of the President's Railroad Commission (1962).
'
0 7 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 91, 5 7(b), 48 Stat. 211.
1.8 Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 319 and S.J. Res. 112 Before the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at 19-27 (1935).
1" Act of February 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 5(4) 41 Stat. 499.
110 Id.
"IChicago, R.I. & G. Ry. Trustee Lease, 233 I.C.C. 21 (1939).
112 308 U.S. 225 (1939).
"'Interstate Commerce Act § 5, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1970).
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Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958114 provides that
the Civil Aeronautics Board must approve mergers and route trans-
fers "upon such terms and modifications as it may prescribe . . .
unless the Board finds that ... the merger ... will not be consistent
with the public interest." There is a similarity between section 408
and the old section 5(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Just as
the ICC had relied on section 5 (4) to impose labor protective con-
ditions in the railroads, the CAB in the 1950 case of United-Western
Acquisition relied on section 408 to reach the same results in the
airlines."' Although generally based on the protective conditions
used in the rail industry, the Board refused to apply the same con-
ditions because of differences between the two industries."'
During the next few years there was a gradual refinement of the
Conditions. The most important change involved procedures for
integration of seniority lists of the merged carriers. Under the
Board rule the parties were to settle voluntarily seniority disputes,
but if unsuccessful the matter would be resolved by private arbitra-
tion.11' Other than requiring that the list be integrated in a "fair
and equitable" manner, the Board left to the parties the criteria for
integrating the lists.
In 1961, the Labor Protective Conditions were standardized by
the Board in the United-Capital Merger Case.11' Except for recent
modifications, 1' these Conditions have invariably been applied
11449 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970).
115 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950). Western Airlines had sought the Board's approval
of the transfer of certain routes and property to United Airlines. ALPA inter-
vened, requesting the Board to impose labor protective provisions. The Board
at first refused ALPA's request, but after a subsequent application by the union,
the Board reopened the hearing and concluded that the parties should settle the
matter themselves. When this failed, the Board imposed labor protection condi-
tions.
116Id. 11 C.A.B. at 710. See also Northwest-Northeast Merger, Orders
70-12-162 and 163, at 22, 28 (CAB Dec. 22, 1970).
117 Braniff-Mid Continent Merger, 15 C.A.B. 708, 717-18 (1952). The Board's
authority in this regard was upheld in American Airlines v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S.Ct. 681 (1972).
11833 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
119 In Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, Nos. 72-4-31, 32 (CAB Apr. 7, 1972),
the Board refused to apply to airlines the Labor Protective Conditions imposed
by the Secretary of Labor on Allegheny under the Rail Passenger Service Act of
1970. In addition, the Board rejected most of the proposed revisions in the stan-
dard Labor Protective Conditions first announced in the United-Capital Merger
Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961), including requests for survivability of collective
bargaining contracts and increases in the amount and duration of various bene-
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without change in every merger since. These Conditions do not
mean, however, that the issue has diminished in importance or that
it has been resolved to the satisfaction of all. Actually the reverse
is true. In every merger since United-Capital various unions have
requested that either the Conditions be scrapped in favor of nego-
tiated conditions or that they be revised to provide more benefits
to the employees. The Board has taken the position that revision
in the standard conditions should only be made when required by
experience indicating the need for the change, or by the particular
factual circumstances in the case being decided."' To achieve this
result, the Board has imposed on the proponent of a revision the
burden of proving that the standard labor protective scheme has
not afforded reasonable protection to employees about to be affected
by the merger.1 '
In determining whether further modification of the standard
conditions is warranted, the following should be kept in focus: (i)
the primary purpose of these Conditions is to promote labor peace
by removing possible causes of labor friction arising from the
merging of two employee complements; and (ii) while these Con-
ditions are designed to insure that employees are not required to
bear the brunt of major route alterations that inure to the benefit
of the carrier, they do not protect the employees against all losses
and were not intended to place a financial strain on the carrier or
to destroy the benefit of the merger. Thus, in its American Flyers
Airlines Acquisition"' decision, the Board stated:
fits. However, the Board for the first time since 1962 undertook a revision of
several of the Conditions. The most important of these was the change in the
burden of proof in regard to eligibility for benefits. Under the new rule, an em-
ployee is entitled to benefits if the merger is the principal or primary causative
factor in any change in his employment. The Board left to the arbitrator the
question of whether the burden of proof should be imposed on either the carrier
or the employee. The arbitrator is to make this determination in light of all
relevant circumstances in the particular case before him. The other major change
in the Labor Protective Conditions involved the procedures for arbitration of dis-
putes arising under the Conditions. Under the new rules, specific provisions are
made for the manner of selecting an arbitrator, expedited hearings, division of
costs, time periods in which to file, and finality of any decision arrived at by the
arbitrator. The parties are still free to arrive at an alternative procedure.
12E.g., Airlift-Slick Route Transfer Case, Order E-26,933 (CAB 1968).
12 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, Order No. 70-12-162 and 163, at 22-23
(CAB Dec. 22, 1970).
"'Order 71-5-80, 81 (May 18, 1971).
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While recognizing that a merger may benefit the public, the Board
has also consistently recognized that this benefit should not be at
the expense of leaving employees without rights. At the same time,
however, it is not our purpose to maintain the status-quo ante for
employees or to become entwined in the details of employer-
employee relations. The conditions are not designed to insure that
each affected employee will be doing exactly the same work, at the
same location and under the same conditions after the merger that
existed before. They are designed rather to insure fundamental
fairness in the treatment of affected employees ... "'
The maintenance of a standard policy is important if mergers,
which are otherwise in the public interest, are to be consummated
on reasonable grounds. Conditions that are either unpredictable
or extreme are likely to constitute a significant deterrent to most
mergers and thus would be contrary to the public interest in the
development of a viable air transportation system adapted to the
needs of commerce. Additionally, any significant deterrent to merger
would not be to the benefit of the employees. Most mergers involve
one economically unhealthy partner. If the weak partner could not
survive through merger, then that partner would probably be forced
out of business by its creditors with the net effect being that all
employees of that carrier would be unemployed. If the weak carrier
were allowed to merge, on the other hand, its employees will be
protected through the Labor Protective Conditions and will share
in the growth of the merged system.
The CAB has done more than a satisfactory job in this area;
legislation is not necessary to curb administrative excesses. The
Packwood bill should be amended, however, to prohibit both pre-
and post-merger negotiations of the labor protective conditions. As
mentioned by the Board in the Northwest-Northeast Merger Case,'"
negotiations of labor protective conditions (i) cause time delays;
(ii) create the possibility of unequal treatment of similarly situated
employees; and (iii) if unsuccessful, would mean that CAB re-
sources in framing balanced conditions and in approving the merger
were needlessly expended."
123 Id.
124 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, Order Nos. 70-12-162 and 163, at 22-23
(1970).
"2'The most important judicial decision involves the opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in I.A.M. v. Northeast Airlines,
- F.2d - (1972). The court in this case held that Northeast Airlines could
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that the subjection of the airlines to the Railway
Labor Act and to the Federal Aviation Act has been a disaster.
This would be true even if both Acts were administered impartially
by experts familiar with airline problems. The structure and prob-
lems of the airlines require a labor law system tailored to its own
needs. This can be accomplished, by making the above-recommend-
ed changes in the existing laws. Senator Packwood's bill provides
a promise for a better future; but, without further amendment, it
will remain only a promise.
not be required to bargain about the protection to be accorded its employees
in regard to post-merger operating changes to be mandated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board or to be made by Delta Airlines as the surviving carrier in the
merger. The court further held that Northeast could not be required to bargain
about the post-merger employment rights of Northeast employees vis-a-vis Delta
employees. In essence, what the court was holding was that the non-surviving car-
rier in a merger had no duty to bargain about either the merger itself or about
post-merger changes to be implemented by the surviving carrier.
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